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ABSTRACT
Governments are coming under increasing pressure to augment their revenues to offset
the social costs of globalization and ever-widening trade and capital liberalization.
Unarguably, the most sustainable way to procure additional resources is taxation. In this
context, one of the main challenges for developing countries is how to bring the informal
sector into the tax net. Influential institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF see the
VAT as the solution.
In Colombia, a weak social contract makes citizens perceive taxes as burdens with a
marginal contribution to the common good. Consequently, evasion is widespread. This
thesis attempts to understand why some small firms evade the VAT and others do not. It
revolves around the supply chain for small parts for buses of the informal transportation
systems of Colombian cities. This sector slowly evolves-under growing liberalization
and top-down formalization of urban transportation-towards higher formality (all firms
are now registered and firm owners hold legal titles of their property and machinery).
They are informal in that they have varying degrees of compliance with State regulations
(most notably tax and labor). Thus, most firms in this study fall somewhere on the
continuum between informality and formality.
In the dynamic context of the sector studied, both external and internal factors determine
a firm's decision to comply. External actors relevant to a firm's compliance with the
VAT include the tax administration agency, clients and suppliers. Internal processes that
influence a firm's decision to comply include moral principles (ethics) and customs of
firm owners, management changes, and business upgrading.
The main findings are: First, differing from the common argument that high costs of
compliance keep firms informal, partial non-compliance is more expensive and complex
than compliance in the sector studied. Second, contrary to what several authors assume,
formality is a prerequisite and not a consequence of growth. Furthermore, partial non-
compliance can keep small firms from growing. In that sense, policies aimed at
promoting tax compliance among small firms in order to increase tax revenue can have
positive effects on economic growth.
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Introduction
Context
Governments around the world have come under increasing pressure to offset the social
costs of globalization and ever-widening trade and capital liberalization (Rodrik, 1997).
To compensate for growing income inequalities, higher public expenditure has
heightened the need for increased public revenues. Unarguably, the most sustainable way
for a government to procure those resources is taxation. In this context, the question of
whom and how to tax becomes relevant. The recipe put forth by influential organizations
like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank has been to focus on the
shorter term and (potentially) large individual taxpayers. "In the longer term, it is
expected that indirect taxes, such as the value-added tax, (...) will gradually insinuate
themselves deeper and deeper into the informal economy" (Joshi and Ayee, 2005, p 2).
The informal sector in developing economies continues to account for significant shares
of the labor market (Tokman, 1992; Lopez 1996; De Soto 2000). Small businesses
constitute what are often referred to as the 'hard-to-tax' sectors of the economy. In this
research, I explore the practices of small firms regarding the VAT. In that sense, I want
not only to discern to what extent can the VAT actually penetrate the informal sector but
also, in a broader sense, to understand why does a small firm complies or not with tax
regulations. This research is hence framed within the debate over taxes and the informal
sector; that is, given the high collection costs it entails, should developing countries try to
bring the informal sectors of their economy into their tax net? And if they should, how
could they go about it? (Joshi and Ayee, 2005).
Contributions and limitations
Clearly, answering these questions might be too ambitious for a small research such as
the one presented here. It is important to bear in mind the specificity of thefirms studied
and the limitations of the methodology used for this research in order to avoid inaccurate
generalizations.
This thesis revolves around the manufacturing firms that supply with small parts the
buses of the informal urban transportation systems of Colombian cities. The firms studied
are distinct (within the 'small firm' categorization) mainly because of their relative high
initial capital investment and reliance on skilled labor. They are similar to other sectors in
the informal economy in that they are all family businesses that started as completely
informal (no registration, no taxes paid, poor labor practices). Although the sector as a
whole has moved towards formality, most firms in this study are to be found somewhere
on the continuum between informality and formality. In order to better understand my
direct observations in the field, I go to great lengths to frame the context in which firms
operate and thrive.
In addition to the limitations imposed by the specific nature of the firms, it is important to
bear in mind that this is a qualitative research based on a small snowball sample (see
methodology section) made in a somewhat static manner'. The specificity of the sector
studied and the limitations of the methodology mean that the findings of this research can
only be seen as contributions to an ongoing debate and extra caution should be taken
when trying to bring them into a more general context. This is why the conclusions of
this thesis are not concrete policy recommendations but mere broad guidelines for future
actions within the Colombian public policy context.
Beyond the limitations described, this research can broaden and qualify the debate over
taxation of the informal sector. Some of its results (particular to a specific sector as they
may be) defy a part of the conventional wisdom upon which much of the debate is based.
In that, they open the door for further research on the subject.
Additionally, when it comes to modeling individual taxpayer behavior, the economic
literature has systematically ignored the broader societal environment in which decisions
are made. This research attempts at bridging that gap, by bringing together
national/global dynamics and trajectories of institutional change with the study of a group
of firms within a specific sector-namely, manufacturing firms of small parts for buses of
the informal urban transportation systems in Colombia.
1 Given the qualitative nature of this study, I can only reconstruct the trajectories over time of
particular firms based on the testimonies of owners, competitors, workers, sales representatives,
clients, and providers. In that, this study takes a "snapshot" of a sector. This is of limited
effectiveness when capturing broader dynamics across time, such as the ones a quantitative
research based on time-series data can provide. That said, the unrecorded nature of most of the
issues addressed in this research makes such an approach impracticable.
The case study
This thesis is divided in four chapters. In the first two chapters, I provide the context in
which the firms studied operate. In the third chapter, I focus on the manufacturing firms
and their business practices; I disaggregate the factors that come into play to determine a
firm's level of compliance with the VAT. In the final chapter, I summarize the lessons
extracted from the case study and I put forth some guidelines for policy design.
Taxation in Colombia
In Colombia, limited tax revenue (due to low taxation and high evasion rates) has
undermined the ability of the State to provide public goods. In addition there has not been
a clear State/society bargaining process to determine fiscal policy. This two
interconnected factors have lead State and society to fail in developing a strong social
contract. This failure influences the way people perceive their tax obligations and
consequently negatively affects tax compliance. Taxes are seen-especially by sectors
with little or no political leverage (like the one in this study)-as imposed regulations
with only a marginal effect in the common good (if at all).
In this context, anti-tax sentiment and widespread non-compliance coupled with a
continuously changing fiscal policy make the work of the tax administration all the more
challenging. Nevertheless, the DIAN (Direccidn de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales-
the National Tax and Customs Administration) has slowly come up to par and today it
has a strong presence in the mind of business owners who dare not to take it lightly. At
present, of the taxes that the DIAN administers at present, the VAT is the highest
yielding (43% of total tax income in 2004).
Despite being perceived by influential organizations as the only way to bring the informal
sector into the tax net, the VAT is far from an ideal solution. In policy and academic
circles, it is believed that the VAT's high costs of compliance coupled with bookkeeping
inability of small firms undermine its ability to penetrate the informal sector.
The supply chain
Rapid urbanization and weak governments (at the national and local levels) allowed
informal systems of urban transportation to develop in Colombian cities over the past
fifty years. Around them, several domestic supply chains flourished to provide the buses
of these systems with the maintenance their owners and drivers could afford. The supply
chain in this study is heterogeneous. It includes firms of all sizes and degrees of formality
who are facing an increasingly changing scenario. Liberalization policies, enhanced
enforcement capacity of tax authorities, and formalization of transportation systems are
some the biggest challenges the small firms studied are facing. It is in this dynamic
context where the studied manufacturing firms have thrived.
Smallfirms: the VAT as seen from below
In Colombia, a certain degree of enforcement and reduction of red tape, have led
businesses across sectors to formally register. The manufacturing firms in this study are
registered and pay at least some of their VAT. Nevertheless, it is not high costs of
compliance that are not keeping firms from complying. Non-compliance is more complex
and expensive than compliance itself both in the short term (increasing managerial and
accounting costs, and in cases of poor management, greatly increasing production costs)
and in the long term (hindering access to formal credit).
In a dynamic context of constant change, both external and internal factors determine a
firm's decision to comply or not. External factors relevant to a firm's compliance with
the VAT include the tax administration, clients and suppliers (those that are relatively
more formal). Internal processes that influence a firm's decision to comply include moral
principles (ethics) and customs of firm owners, management changes, and production
upgrading.
Lessons
The main findings of this research are: First, in contrast to the common argument that
high costs of compliance keep firms informal (e.g. De Soto, 1989, 2000; Ebrill et al,
2001), in the sector studied, partial non-compliance is more expensive and complex than
compliance. Second, contrary to what several authors assume (e.g. Maloney, 2004)
formality is prerequisite and not a consequence of growth. Furthermore, non-compliance
keeps small firms from growing.
Research Methodology
Fieldwork for this thesis was carried out during two and a half month during the summer
of 2005. The research methodology was primarily qualitative, using a snowball sample
and relying on face-to-face interviews (28 in total) with key actors2: owners3 (2+1+8+5),
managers (0+1+2+4), and one accountant (0+0+1+0). I also interviewed public officials
at the DIAN (2) and at Bogota's local tax administration (1) and the director of the
management upgrade program of the CCB (1). Where relevant, quantitative supporting
data was sought from multiple sources, especially form the DIAN, the Banco de la
Rep blica (Colombia's central bank) and the DANE (Colombian Census and Statistics
Bureau).
2 In addition to formal interviews, informal conversations with owners and especially with sales
representatives of firms provided invaluable insights on the business practices in the sector.
Informal conversations with a former official of Transmilenio also provided insights on the
bigger picture of the urban transportation sector in Colombia.
3 Numbers in parentheses are meant to reflect the number of interviews in each link of the supply
chain (scrap metal collectors + metallurgical firms + manufacturing firms + retail and mechanical
shops).
Chapter I. Taxation in Colombia
1. Tax Compliance and Taxation in Colombia
1.1. Tax Compliance
The bulk of academic literature on tax compliance revolves around income tax in
developed countries and it has stemmed from neoclassical economic theory4. Taxpayers
are seen as wealth-maximizing individuals, with a natural tendency to free ride and shirk
(Cowell, 1990). Economists have modeled evasion as 'a taxpayer adding one more risky
asset to a portfolio'. The explanatory power of these models has proved limited. Many (if
not most) taxpayers comply more fully than what these models can predict and "a
convincing explanation for why full compliance so often arises as a rule of conduct is still
to be proposed" (Marchese, 2004, p 255). Some economists have started "to grapple with
the findings from other social sciences that could explain the observed compliance
levels" (Andreoni et al. 1998, p 819).
Recent works have incorporated refinements in collective action theory to generate a
more nuanced approach to individual taxpayer behavior. Authors in this strand of the
4 For reviews on that body of academic work see Pyle (1991), Andreoni et al. (1998) and
Marchese (2004).
literature understand that taxpayers go beyond material calculations and they have moral
principles and are affected by social factors (Marchese, 2004). Individuals are now seen
as emotional/moral reciprocators5 (Kahan, 2005) and past policy recipes are starting to be
revisited in the light of new findings. These works share one premise; they believe that
"tax compliance is the consummate collective action from a public policy point of view"
(Kahan, 2005, p 10). Nevertheless, both past and current efforts to build microeconomic
models of taxpayer behavior understandably ignore broader societal factors. In that, these
stylized models have failed to capture broader cultural, political and macroeconomic
dynamics that affect tax compliance decisions by individuals.
This research tries to bridge that gap by framing individual behavior of taxpayers within
the broader political and macroeconomic context of a specific developing country,
Colombia.
One of the most notorious absences in the tax-compliance literature has to do with the
question of 'where do taxes come from and what is the inference of a tax's origin on its
level of compliance'. It is somehow understandable, given that in industrialized countries
there is a relatively explicit agreement between citizens and State over how much is to be
collected and whatfor. The agreement is the result of a state/society bargaining process.
In simple terms, when a goal is set for the country (either by a ruler-e.g. eighteen
century England-or through a democratic process) a negotiation takes place between the
State and politically engaged organized citizens (political parties, unions, business
5 "When they perceive that others are behaving cooperatively, individuals are moved by honor,
altruism, and like dispositions to contribute to public goods even without the inducement of
material incentives. When, in contrast, they perceive that others are shirking or otherwise taking
advantage of them, individuals are moved by resentment and pride to retaliate." (Kahan, 2005, p
1)
associations) over who is going to pay and how much. The collective action is explicit
and responsibilities of both State and citizens are clear. Thus developed countries have
managed to build strong social contracts over time (Schneider et al., 2004). Contrastingly,
social contracts tend to be weak in the developing world. Although there is heated debate
over government expenditure and policies, "the processes of making and changing tax
policy are not very transparent" (Schneider et al., 2004, p. 1). I now turn to the question
of why this is so.
1.2. Political Economy of Taxation in Colombia
Mick Moore (2004) has explored the question of why are taxation issues largely absent
from the public political agendas in the 'South'-i.e. why have societies in the
developing world have failed to build strong social contracts?
1.2.1. How is tax legislation shaped in Colombia?
Given that Moore (2004) tries to answer the question for the entire developing world, not
all his arguments stand true for the Colombian case. Nevertheless, several of them can
help explain the political dynamics of taxation in Colombia. In the following paragraphs,
I briefly summarize his main arguments and explore their relevance in the Colombian
context. I also bring forth additional arguments from other authors.
First, governments in most developing countries finance a large share of their
expenditures with non-tax sources. Their revenues come from unearned rents, especially
from natural resources, and/or strategic rents-i.e. military and development aid. Despite
being the fourth largest 'beneficiary' of U.S. military aid (after Israel, Egypt and Iraq),
foreign aid in Colombia accounts only for a small share of total public expenditures 6. The
contribution is significant enough to transform the U.S. executive and legislature in
constituencies of the Colombian government, but Colombia is far from other countries in
the developing world-especially in sub-Saharan Africa-where foreign aid is the most
significant financial source for public spending (CFS, 2005).
Second, the growing prevalence of the 'less visible' indirect taxes keeps taxes outside the
public debate. This can be explained by three factors. (i) Economies that revolve around
primary commodities make international trade a priority for tax revenue. Nevertheless,
Colombia's share of VAT on imports is lower than that of its neighbors-around 32%,
compared to 40% in Peru and 58% in Bolivia (Ebrill et al., 2001). (ii) Indirect taxes (on
transactions and not on income or wealth) are less unpopular politically7 . (iii) Low
average incomes translate into low revenue from personal income tax. In Colombia, this
is severe. In 2004, only 523.122 individuals/businesses filed their income/corporate tax
returns (in a country of over forty million people). Of them, 374.631 corresponded to
personal income tax returns (1.7% population economically active), which in turn
represented only 4% of overall income/corporate tax revenue (Fedesarrollo, 2005). Thus,
the bulk of the income/corporate tax comes from a few large corporate taxpayers. An
additional explanation (see 3.1.1. in this chapter) for the prevalence of indirect taxes is
the overt promotion of such mechanisms by multilateral agencies (Goode, 2000;
6 According to Center for International Policy, since 2000, Colombia has received over half a
billion dollars on average per year in military and police assistance from the U.S.. The tax
revenue over the same period was around 14 billion dollars per year in average.
7 "Indirect taxes, being less visible, tend to encounter less resistance than direct taxes." (Burgess
and Stem, 1993, p 802)
Schneider et al., 2004; Joshi and Ayee, 2005). In Colombia, The VAT was introduced in
the mid-sixties and its significance as a share of total tax income predates this recent
trend (see 1.3.2).
Third, there are incentives for individualized political strategies. As described above, a
large share of tax revenue comes from a relatively small number of large corporate
taxpayers8 . This allows for small pressure groups, to lobby for exemptions and favorable
policies in general. Exemplary cases of small yet powerful pressure groups or individuals
in Colombia include first and foremost the beer monopoly9 (Reyes, 2003), and others like
the financial sector'0 , oil companies", and non-profits. Each interest group faces a
different set of taxes. Additionally, this concentration is coupled by a tax system that is
complex (e.g. a highly differentiated VAT), changeable (see 2. and 3.3 in this chapter),
and of discretionary application.
Fourth, in past decades, especially in South America "high inflation [undermined] any
incentive to invest scarce political resources in negotiating taxation issues." (Moore,
2004, p. 18). Inflation is a menace of the past. Colombia has not seen double-digit
inflation in over 15 years and it is currently well under 5%.
8 In developing countries, "an insufficiency of resources leads administrations to concentrate their
enforcement efforts on large taxpayers" (Casanegra de Jantscher, 1990, p 179).
9 Against new levies on beer and most recently to avoid any taxes in the recent merger with a
South African brewing company.
'0 Against the bank debit tax, introduced in 1998 and to prevent inflation adjustments from being
removed from tax legislation.
" To avoid heavier taxation on their activities-as has happened in Venezuela and Bolivia in
recent years.
12 To protect the exemptions on income/corporate tax made on donations. They work closely with
banks, which also benefit greatly from current legislation.
Fifth, there is a factor widely studied in the Colombian context, especially at the local
level. The relationship between State and society are more founded on patronage driven
agreements than on open rights and obligations. Widespread clientelism limits the
transparency of policy processes and undermines democratic participation in general
(Gutierrez, 1998). Agreements are based on direct benefits (jobs, contracts, construction
materials), not on the open representation of particular interests that may lead to policy
changes. This hinders the development of state/society bargaining over the central issue
of taxes.
Finally, and on a similar line, Tendler's (2005) research in Brazil points to a
particularistic unspoken agreement "between politicians and their constituents-myriad
small-firm owners, many in the informal sector" (p 14). Politicians advocate for policies
that are "burden-relieving"-immediate, automatic, universal, and conspicuous
exemptions and subsidies to small firms. The promotion of such policies is often
accompanied by the tacit deal between politicians and small firms to provide subsidies
and exemptions in exchange for political support. In the case of the sector studied, lack of
organization and cooperation among firms had translated in lack of open participation in
the political processes (see 111.3.1.). Nevertheless, it is common to see Colombian
politicians of all levels and strides, from the president to councilmen of small towns,
advocate for such "burden relieving" policies.
All these reasons explain why taxation has failed to be among "the range of concerns that
politically concern citizens debate, and around which political parties and interest group
organizations mobilize" (Moore, 2004, p. 8). This failure systematically undermines the
construction of a strong social contract (Schneider et al., 2004). The link between tax and
public expenditure is absent and thus a notion of collective action for the procurement of
collective goods fails to develop.
1.2.2. Taxation without a strong social contract
In this context, taxes are seen only as one among several government-imposed
regulations. Proof of that is that law-abiding firm owners in this study do not see non-
compliers as free-riders. Someone else's noncompliance is seen as a problem only if it
comes from a competitor that does not pay taxes in order to provide products with a
lower price to the final customer (see 2.1.1 in Chapter III). In simple words, what is
found to be problematic is not that 'he is not contributing to the pool' (i.e. free-riding) or
that 'he is breaking the law' but that 'he is unlawfully stealing clients'.
From a top-down perspective, the collective action entailed by taxation is clear. People
pay their taxes and the State provides goods that benefit all payers (social welfare,
defense, infrastructure, etc.). From a bottom-up perspective, in the context of a weak
social contract, the collective action is not so clear. In developing countries, inefficient
States and the lack state/society bargaining to shape fiscal policy have lead citizens to
perceive taxes as burdens with (if any at all) a marginal effect on the common good. In
this way, from the perspective of the citizen, taxes are imposed from above and the
rationale behind them is rarely evident. Without a strong social contract, taxes are
reduced to a burden, loosing their meaning as contributions for the 'common good'. It is
13 According to a survey conducted by Bogota's Institute of Tourism and Culture, only 23,2% of
citizens consider that "taxes are invested for the benefit of the city" (IDCT, 2003).
safe to assume that with such weak social contract, a country will have higher evasion
rates (see the next section for the case of Colombia). Evasion will in turn reduce the
State's revenue and its expenditure capacity creating a vicious circle; "administrative
weakness and distorted economic activity complicate the construction of a social contract
around tax, in part by starving the state of resources with which to purchase public
support" (Moore, 2004, p 11).
A new strand of literature on the political economy of taxation in the third world is
developing around this cycle. In the Center for the Future State's Signposts to More
Effective States (2005), taxation is put forth as a mean to "get a more effective,
accountable public authority that might be more responsive to the needs of poor people"
(p. 44). It is so because tax can be a factor that encourages constructive state/society
engagement. Other factors include participatory policy mechanisms, and careful design
and implementation of anti-poverty programs.
From this perspective, it is important to remember that the "invisibility" of the VAT-
which makes it easier to implement-further weakens the social contract.
2. Colombian Tax Administration
"On paper at least, Colombia has one of the best tax systems for a developing
economy."
McLure and Zodrow (1997 p. 113)
As seen in the previous section, the Colombian State has traditionally been weak in no
small part due to limited tax revenues. Powerful elites have influenced the political
system to keep the level of taxation from rising. This becomes evident in the low level of
taxation that the country held until the mid-eighties. Additionally, there has been a
longstanding tradition of anti-tax sentiment combined with high levels of evasion.
Kalmanovitz (2005) holds that during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, evasion
was around 1.75% of GDP. More recently, Vasquez-Caro and Slemrod (2005) estimated
that between 1997 and 2000, evasion rate of VAT among formal businesses was around
23%--i.e. around 1% of GDP just in VAT evasion.
Only until recently (the mid eighties) has the government revenue increased in a
consistent manner.
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The Colombian tax system is administered by the DIAN (Spanish acronym of National
Tax and Customs Agency). Currently the DIAN has eighty thousand employees in thirty-
two cities and it administers six taxes (income, VAT, financial transactions, customs,
gasoline, and stamp). From 1980 to 2002, it underwent at least five major reorganizations
14 All graphs in this chapter were made by the author with data from the DIAN and the Banco de
la Republica (the Colombian Central Bank).
and there were 22 fiscal reforms. In short, "the tax system has been in almost constant
flux during the past thirty years" (McLure and Zodrow, 1997, p 57). Most recently, the
DIAN's resources have increased from 0.7% of collections in 1993 to 1.8% in 2001
(Vasquez-Caro and Slemrod, 2005). Nevertheless, officials I interviewed feel the agency
is still well below an adequate level of funding that would be around 5% of collections
(the average level of funding of such agencies in developed countries). They perceive
improvements on the levels of corruption inside the agency but they admit there is still
work to be done, especially in customs.
Despite scarce resources and some corruption, over time the DIAN has positioned itself
as a believable enforcer of tax regulations and today has a strong presence in the mind of
business owners (see 111.2.2.1). In 2003, the DIAN performed around 35.000 visits to
small and medium enterprises in major cities (purpose of the visits included
identification, verification of inscription, annulment of ID, and audits in general).
3. The Value Added Tax (VAT)
3.1. Formalizing and informalizing features of the VAT
In this section, I present a review of the some of the literature on VAT in developing
countries, as well as some theoretical considerations on the subject. The arguments
presented in this section will be contrasted in Chapter III with the evidence collected in
the fieldwork I carried in Colombia during the summer of 2005.
3.1.1. Formalizing potential of VA T: chained structure
"The informal sector is informal only because the existing tax machinery has not
found a way to bring it into the tax net, but the incentive of rebates on inputs may turn
that trick."
John Toye (2000, p. 38)
Assuming that tax enforcement can be effective, VAT is structured in a manner that
makes evasion more difficult. Firms pay tax only on the value they add to the product, in
other words, they deduct from the tax payment they receive from buyers the tax they paid
to suppliers. This means firms are the collectors of the tax, reducing collection costs for
the tax administration. In this way, the entire economy helps in the enforcement. This is
why multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
favor systems of indirect taxation over systems of direct taxation (Goode, 2000;
Schneider et al., 2004; Joshi and Ayee, 2005). Additionally, it is expected that indirect
taxation systems, such as the VAT, will in the longer term "gradually insinuate
themselves deeper and deeper into the informal economy" (Joshi and Ayee, 2005, p. 2).
This might be easier to understand from a supply chain perspective. The chained structure
of the VAT forces firms that would otherwise operate 'under the radar' to become
visible. In this manner, one could expect entire supply chains to 'surface' as the result of
the implementation of the VAT. I the scheme below, I present a stylized diagram of a
supply chain of three firms producing twenty units with a ten percent VAT.
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3.1.2. Informalizing force of the VAT
In The Other Path, Hernando De Soto (1989) gives a detailed account of how an
oppressive and illegitimate government bureaucracy, with its endless streams of red tape
and high costs of compliance with the law, locks the poor out of the country's economic
system. This group-a majority in Peru-is thus forced into the underground world of the
informal economy.
Similarly, the strongest case made against the VAT is that its compliance implies
excessive costs for taxpayers, especially for small firms. There is no data for developing
countries but in industrialized economies,
"Since these are largely fixed costs, independent of the amount of tax payable, they
fall especially heavily on smaller traders: Cnossen (1994) puts them in the order of 2
percent of turnover for those with turnover below $50,000, falling to about 0.3
percent for those with turnover above $500,000."
Liam Ebrill et al. (2001, p 53)
What is important to consider when dealing with compliance with VAT is that what
matters is "the ability to maintain records of paid invoices, incoming and out going, when
each paid incoming invoice is an entitlement to a tax credit" (Toye, 2000, p. 38).
Consequently, VAT requires accounting and managerial structures that (it is commonly
believed) small firms do not have and in most cases, cannot afford.
These high costs of compliance coupled with sheer bookkeeping inability of small firms
would translate into an informalizing force of the VAT.
3.2. VAT in Colombia
For the past two decades, tax experts and advisers have seen the Value-Added Tax as the
most effective way for developing countries to increase their tax revenue (Toye, 2000).
Influential institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund often
favor its implementation in countries where a large informal sector would hinder a strong
system of direct taxation (Goode, 2000; Moore, 2004; Joshi and Ayee, 2005). Relatively
low political visibility and high returns make the VAT the preferred choice for
governments in the developing world (Moore, 2004).
The case of Colombia seems special given that the VAT was introduced in 1965. It was
introduced as a broad-based sales tax structured like a manufacturers' tax on finished
goods and imports. The system was converted in the next year into an invoice/credit type
VAT (McLure and Zodrow, 1997). Ever since, VAT legislation has been growing; its
rates have multiplied, and its base has expanded. The following graph shows the growing
significance of the Value Added Tax as a percentage of the overall government tax
income.
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The VAT went from accounting for less than 10% to almost 50% of total tax revenue.
For over a decade the VAT has been the highest yielding tax in Colombia amounting to
over 5.4% of GDP in 2004. It is noteworthy how the VAT grew in importance after the
trade liberalization policies of the early nineties. An answer to why this is so can be
found when we look at the way the VAT is collected.
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In the graph above, Imports represent the VAT levied on imported goods. Despite
growing contraband, trade liberalization and stronger customs have increase the amount
collected from imports. Self-withholding was a collection figure introduced in 1996
where large businesses started withholding 75% of the VAT that they would otherwise
pay when buying from suppliers. Thus, large firms not only collect the VAT from their
clients but also from themselves. Declaration refers to the VAT collected by firms over
goods they produce and sell. It is in this area that I focus in chapter III when I look at the
business practices of small firms.
Beyond its expansion both as gross income and as share of overall revenue, the VAT still
has room to grow; its current base is only 33% of GDP15, and a "substantial fraction of
goods and services are exempt from tax or are zero rated" (Bird et al., 2005, p. 21). At the
same time, tax experts call for simplification of the VAT system. Colombia's VAT has
the highest number of rates (nine) in the world (Ebrill et al., 2001; Fedesarrollo, 2005).
This high differentiation in rates and exemptions have made the VAT legislation complex
and thus hard and expensive to administer. To counter the relatively regressive nature of
the VAT (Ebrill et al., 2001) conscious efforts have been made. Today, most products of
regular consumption by the poor are exempt (education, basic nutrition). Nevertheless, in
Colombia the VAT is "widely thought of as a tax on the poor, whereas the income tax is
thought of as a tax on higher income households" (Bird et al., 2005, p. 21).
Conclusions
In Colombia, limited tax revenue (due to low taxation and high evasion rates) has
undermined the ability of the State to provide public goods. In addition there has not been
a clear State/society bargaining process to determine fiscal policy. This two
1s As compared to VAT bases around 50% of GDP in other countries in Latin America (Ebrill et
al., 2001).
interconnected factors have lead State and society to fail in developing a strong social
contract. This failure influences the way people perceive their tax obligations and
consequently affects tax compliance. Taxes are seen-especially by sectors with little or
no political leverage (like the one in this study)-as imposed regulations.
In this context, anti-tax sentiment and widespread noncompliance coupled with a
continuously changing fiscal policy make the work of the tax administration all the more
challenging. Nevertheless, the tax administration (DIAN) has slowly come up to par and
today it is a strong presence in the mind of business owners who dare not to take it
lightly. At present, of the taxes that the DIAN administers, the VAT is the highest
yielding (43% of total tax income in 2004).
Despite being perceived as the only way to bring the informal sector into the tax net, the
VAT is far from an ideal solution. It is believed that the VAT's high costs of compliance
coupled with bookkeeping inability of small firms undermine its ability to penetrate the
informal sector.
Chapter 1l. The Supply Chain
This research revolves around the supply chain because (as seen in 1.3) compliance with
the VAT is linked to the relationships between sellers and buyers-i.e. the different links
in the supply chain.
In this chapter, I will first go over the dynamics of urban transportation in Bogota, that is,
the context in which the manufacturing sector studied has thrived for over twenty years. I
will then focus on the different links of the supply chain of small parts for buses, one of
which are the manufacturing firms studied. Finally, I will explore some of the dynamics
(both local and global) that are affecting this sector both from perspective of the demand
for products and the supply of raw material.
1. Transportation in Bogota
In this section, I explore the context (institutional, economic and social) in which the
sector studied has evolved. Although the production of manufacturing firms in this study
is not limited to the market of Bogota 6 , the case of Bogota is representative of urban
transportation dynamics in other cities in Colombia (and South America). It also sheds
16 As will be described later, firms produce for the national market and marginally for the markets
of neighboring countries.
light on the question of why and how did both urban transportation and the sector studied
thrived in the midst of informality.
1.1. History of modern public transportation in Bogota (in a nutshell)
Bogota was a small town for over four hundred years' 7 . In the last century, its growth
boomed and it is now a seven million inhabitants developing metropolis. A weak and
centralized national government (as will be described in 1.2.) had to deal with this rapid
urbanization. At the local level, it was not until 1988 that majors started to be
democratically elected in Colombia and it was not until 1991 that a new Constitution
drew the lines for serious political and fiscal decentralization. This means that frail local
governments had to cope with harsh urbanization processes. In this context, Bogota's
transportation agency failed to provide or even regulate public transportation. Private
entrepreneurs handled the provision of the service, having national and local authorities
as regulators and local authorities as enforcers of regulations. It was a combination of
private provision under ill-conceived and poorly enforced regulations that lead to a
perverse transportation system and the consequent degradation of living conditions in the
city (congestion, pollution, insecurity). For over forty years the local government tried to
come up with a planned mass transportation system for the city. Political power of local
bus companies, national and local institutional weakness, and lack of coordination
between national and local governments condemned all efforts. Only in 2001, ten years
after the serious efforts of decentralization began, and after five years of planning and
17 In 1832, it had 36.465 inhabitants; in 1881, 84.723 inhabitants and at the turn of the century it
had 100.000. In 1938, its four hundredth anniversary, Bogota had 333.312 inhabitants. By 1950,
after the inclusion of five neighboring towns, it reached two millions. (Source: Alcaldia Mayor de
Bogota and Banco de la Repniblica)
building, did Bogota's government started operating a mass public transportation system.
Nevertheless, it is only the beginning. Five years later, at the end of phase II the new
system provides 15% of travels within the city. In later sections of this chapter, I will
explore some of the consequences for local businesses of the formalization of
transportation in the city.
1.2. The informal urban transportation system18
1.2.1. Institutional arrangement
In this section, I will describe to some detail the institutional arrangement that determines
the structure of incentives that in turn explains the dynamics of operation and
maintenance of the buses.
The Secretaria de Transito y Transporte (STT) is the local agency responsible of issuing
and enforcing traffic regulations for Bogota; it also enforces those mandated by the
national government. The STT is responsible for authorizing the creation and overseeing
the operation of bus companies, assigning bus routes, and determining the fleet a bus
company needs to serve the assigned routes.
Bus companies in turn, have rights over bus routes issued by the STT. The sixty-six
existing companies own few buses19 and their assets are the routes-i.e. they are
basically intermediaries between the State and the actual providers of the service.
Powerful trade associations of bus companies lobby before the STT for new routes
18 Sections 1.2.1. and 1.3.1. draw heavily from Ardila (2004).
19 96% of the bus companies own less than 10% of their fleet, the legally required percentage.
(incapable of assessing the actual demand for transportation in the city), and Congress
and the Transportation Ministry of the national government for favorable legislation,
most notably regulations on the lifespan of vehicles20.
Bus companies rent the routes to the owners of the buses, who can only operate if
affiliated to a bus company. Bus owners and drivers are the actual providers of public
transportation. There is a lump sum affiliation fee plus monthly fees. The bus owners
seek routes that have a high volume of passengers and a high turnover (determinants of
total revenue). They invest the largest amount of capital and decide when and where to
operate and maintain the buses. They usually hire one driver to operate their bus and pay
him on the basis of a commission per passenger (occasionally, the owner is the driver).
Given the government-imposed low fares, having a single driver per bus means that he
has to work shifts of 13 or 14 hours a day to make a living.
In short, the incentive structure has bus companies trying to get more routes (even if they
largely overlap existing ones), bus owners having their buses run as long as possible
(hours/day and years/vehicle) and bus drivers trying to get as much passengers as
possible. Given the weakness (and corruption) of the STT there are too many authorized
routes (517) and to too many buses (20,764 in 1997 in the hands of 25,000 owners).
Oversupply has been a problem for over a decade. In 1993, a law sought to restrict the
20 International standards are around fifteen years. In Colombia, a bus can legally operate in
public transportation for thirty years. After that, most are scrapped and a few become school
buses.
number of licenses to operate buses within the city2 1. Two problems unfolded. First,
illegal (pirate) buses proliferated, although they are now being controlled with the
implementation of a smart card. Second, in 2001, a court ruling allowed Carlos Delgado,
a bus operator, to get new licenses to operate new buses. This small opening-under a
scheme where Delgado would get the license and sell it the next day-translated in 1.741
additional buses legally entering the transportation system22 with a personal profit
calculated around US$13 million (El Tiempo 10/08/2005a).
This oversupply-evident in the conspicuous low average occupation of vehicles-
means extreme economic competition takes place in the street (a phenomenon referred to
as Guerra del Centavo). Drivers disregard schedules, race against each other and stop at
any place a prospective passenger demands. They literally but also metaphorically are
'racing' to the bottom2 3 . Maintenance is not frequent and it has to be cheap. This
translates in a large demand for cheap parts of low/intermediate quality. As will be
explained in chapter III, here is where small firms come in.
1.2.2. Production of buses
21 For a new bus to start working in public transportation, another one has to be scrapped thus
keeping the number of buses constant.
22 Finally in April 2005, the STT finally closed this legal loophole under the largest media scandal
the current city administration has endured: the heads of the STT and the Public Works agency
(SOP) rolled because of this incident. Carlos Delgado was the biggest contributor to the electoral
campaigns of the Mayor, nine councilmen as well as that of the mayor of Soacha, a one million
inhabitants neighboring town to which Transmilenio is being extended (El Tiempo 10/08/2005b).
23 In 2002, the city government imposed a rotating restriction of buses and taxis (allowing them to
circulate only three out of five business days). The measure was received with harsh resistance.
Bus and taxi owners blocked streets and brought the city to a halt. After a week of negotiations,
government and bus companies associations agreed to limit the restriction to only one day
including Saturdays. Oversupply is still a problem with half occupied buses contributing to the
congestion of the city's main arteries and to the pollution of the city as a whole (Bogota now
ranks as the third most polluted city in Latin America after Mexico D.F. and Santiago de Chile).
There are four types of buses, each with a distinctive market. The first two correspond to
larger vehicles: ejecutivo and corriente. It is here where the largest firms are to be found:
GM's Colmotores (Chevrolet) and a few local ones (Superior, el Sol, JGB, Del Sur). In
the market for medium-size vehicles, busetas, competition is stronger with GM and
Mazda (both with local assembly plants) competing with Latin American companies
Encava, Agrale and Sultana (from Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico respectively) and
several local firms (Fana, JGB, Del Sur, among others). The market for the smallest
vehicles, colectivos, is the most competitive for regular vans can be easily adapted. Here,
most car companies (Asia, Iveco, Kia, Mercedes Benz, VW, Hyundai, Mazda, Nissan,
Mitsubishi, Daihatsu, Chevrolet) compete with several local firms (NPU, Fana, JGB, Del
Sur, among others).
It is important to note that all local firms manufacture the bodies and use imported
chassis 24. The chassis includes all mechanical parts: engine, gearbox, axles, and brake
system. The firms in this study produce small parts that are replacements for some of
these mechanical systems. Body designs are somewhat idiosyncratic (especially in
smaller vehicles) and manufacturing is labor-intensive. It is also noteworthy that most
buses are assembled (if not manufactured) locally. Imports are limited and as seen bellow
this is not by chance.
1.2.3. Procurement ofparts
The buses that run across the city contain many parts that are relatively easy to produce,
that do not require sophisticated production engineering (Amsden, 2001). Thus, a large
24 Myriad brands are used, including Mercedes Benz, VW, Renault, Hyundai, Daewoo, Hino
(Toyota), Mazda, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Daihatsu, Chevrolet/Isuzu, International and Agrale.
set of labor-intensive small and medium industries (the subject of this research) have
developed around the transportation system providing retail and mechanical shops with
cheap, low/intermediate quality parts.
As described earlier, buses.are subject to heavy usage and little maintenance. When they
require maintenance owners and drivers of buses (final consumers in the supply chain)
turn to mechanical shops or to (more informal) small retail shops (see 2.4. in this
chapter).
1.3. The new Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) System - Transmilenio
1.3.1. A superimposed system
In 1996, the Japan International Cooperation Agency presented a Transportation Master
Plan for Bogota with 20 years range. It included a system of an upgraded version of the
bus way built during the Pastrana administration (88-90). It was not until mayor Enrique
Pefialosa got to power in 1998 that serious plans were developed (Chaparro, 2002).
Inspired by the Curitiba system (Brazil), a Bus Rapid Transit was designed. The system
consists of large articulated buses running along dedicated lanes. They pick up riders at
stations with a subway-like collection system (smart cards and turnstiles). A new city
agency called Transmilenio was created. It was in charge of planning the system and
supervising daily service (contracting out service provision with new and highly
capitalized operators), and of collecting the fares (paying operators per kilometer logged).
By taking the cash flow out of the hands of bus owners and drivers, the new system
eliminates the Guerra del Centavo and provides and orderly operation.
In order to overcome the political blockade of bus companies (that had sunk previous
efforts), the largest bus companies were granted rights over the operation of the new
buses. The success of Transmilenio has created a BRT-rush across Colombia 25 and the
developing world promoted by the World Bank and other development agencies26. The
new system displaces the old system at different levels and has generated interesting
opportunities for some of the larger businesses as well as problems for the smaller, more
vulnerable ones.
1.3.2. Displacement, adaptation and growth
The new buses are bought from Brazilian companies (Marcopolo and Busscar). They also
manufacture only the body using Volvo and Mercedes Benz chassis. The GM assembly
plant in Colombia (Colmotores) pushed for, and succeeded in having the Foreign
Commerce Ministry treat the new buses as consumer goods instead capital goods-in
opposition to what Bogota's city government and the new operators intended. This
implied higher tariffs for the Brazilian buses. However, this worked out for the best for
other local businesses. Marcopolo entered a joint venture with Superior (one of the
largest local body manufacturers at the time) that resulted in a refurbished large plant in
the south of Bogota, Superpolo27 . Today, the experience of this new company has
25 With strong support from the national government, six cities are in planning or bidding stages
for the implementation of BRT: Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla, Pereira, Cartagena, and
Bucaramanga.
26 It is much cheaper than other mass transportation alternatives such as the light rail and the
subway. According to Revista Dinero (2/26/2006) projects for BRT systems are underway in
Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Senegal, India, Bangladesh, Israel, Vietnam, Pakistan, Laos,
Philippines, Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama and Peru.27 Busscar is exploring ways to open a plant in Colombia under a similar arrangement.
allowed it to get a contract for Quito's BRT and started to export buses from Colombia
earlier this year.
There are other examples of local firms that grew thanks to the new system and now have
great opportunities locally and abroad. The firm that developed (through exploratory
research) the fare collection system has earned contracts domestically and in Caracas,
Mexico and Jakarta. Two of Transmilenio's bus operators bided for and got the operation
of three of the five new BRT corridors in Santiago de Chile.
As for the maintenance of the fleet, the different operators do it at Transmilenio's bus
depots. They procure large quantities of parts seeking economies of scale while also
demanding high quality products (ISO 9000 certifications). Very few manufacturing
firms were up to the challenge but they have prospered greatly in this high-end market.
The new system has physically displaced the old one. For each new articulated red bus
that enters the Transmilenio system, seven old buses have to be scrapped. To date, 4200
buses have been scrapped as 900 articulated buses currently operate within the system 28.
Additionally, some of the new BRT corridors run where playas29 used to operate (e.g.
Autopista Norte) and several of the existing ones (most notably, those along Calle 13) are
bound to disappear as the new system expands.
Nevertheless, the further expansion of the system, in the medium and long term, is far
from guaranteed. The national government is committed to contribute with 70% of the
infrastructure construction costs. The city's share is guaranteed with 25% of the gasoline
surcharge tax dedicated to Transmilenio. But the system has 84 km (out of 388 km) and
28 Data on the number of scrapped buses are subject to controversy. I am using the most
conservative estimate of the STT.29 Playas are described below in 2.4.
there are funds for another 21 km. Deep disagreements between national and local
government over the costs per km are threatening the future expansion of the system (El
Tiempo 03/31/06).
1.4. Concluding remarks on Urban Transportation in Bogota
Manufacture and service small businesses that have traditionally supplied with parts and
maintenance the transportation system in Bogota are slowly advancing towards formality
under state agencies growing stronger and liberalization policies bringing foreign
competition. Their low cost products have allowed the informal transportation system to
operate under a scheme of low fares and high accessibility. The role of these small firms
has been that of contributing in the provision of a service that the State should have
provided but that could not due to its weakness.
The entry of Transmilenio has meant that firms that had reached a certain level of
experience and professional management were able to enter a larger, globalized market.
Meanwhile, the most backward and informal firms are left behind. Eventually, they will
have to adapt by going into other markets or simply disappear.
2. Links of the supply chain of small parts for buses
The supply chain allows us to understand how a raw material (i.e. scrap copper) is
transformed into a product sold to the final costumer (i.e. bus owners and drivers). The
supply chain possesses a heterogeneous mixture of businesses of all sizes and degrees of
formality. For the purpose of this study, the supply chain will be divided into four links:
scrap metal collectors (Chatarreros), raw material suppliers, manufacturing firms, and
retail and mechanical shops3 0.
2.1. Large scrap metal collectors - Chatarreros
In the hands of a few, scrap copper is a huge yet murky business. Scrap copper comes
mostly from replaced or stolen public wiring cables and in lesser quantities from old
pans, electric motor parts, and old piping among others. Chatarreros buy from petty
cable thieves and street scrap collectors-mostly homeless recyclers and zorreros .
Collection centers consist of multiple smeary warehouses and open lots located within a
few blocks in downtown Bogota belonging to a family of chatarreros. Each of the
different members of a family (e.g. a father and two siblings) manages its own
independent business. Yet they collaborate with each other and they all work under the
same name (with slight variations for registration purposes).
They have a bad reputation among owners of metallurgical and manufacturing firms of
the supply chain. One metallurgical firm from Medellin tried to open a scrap collection
center in Bogota but established chatarreros waged a price war (dumping). Additionally
dealing with street collectors and cable thieves proved too difficult. The enterprise failed
after one year.
30 A previous link to the Chatarreros is the homeless recyclers and zorreros. It is a sector where
taxes are non-existent and ties with child labor, theft, drug trading/consumption and other illegal
activities abound. I refer only marginally to them. This is so because making a fair
description/analysis of this sector would have required extensive additional work and I believe it
would have taken this research too far from its main focus-namely tax compliance of small
manufacturing firms.
31 Scrap collectors that go around the city in rudimentary horse-powered vehicles (called zorras)
buying scrap from businesses and homes.
Despite the apparent low profile of this business and rumors about its alleged connections
to criminal networks-from cable and manhole-cover thieves to car robbery bands-
chatarreros are powerful businessmen. When selling their material, a single business deal
can be worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. They are connected to a global market;
they are well informed of international prices32 and can choose to sell to domestic
businesses or to export (mostly to China); the highest bidder gets the material.
2.2. Metallurgical firms (Raw material suppliers)
Here is where the largest firms in the whole chain are to be found. Due to the type of
machinery used, their capital investment is vastly superior to that of manufacturing firms:
the start up investment for one of these industries is around one million dollars while a
small manufacturing firm could start with around US$5.000. There was a monopoly over
the market since the 1950-when a firm based in Medellin substituted imports from
Germany-up until the mid-nineties when the liberalization of the economy allowed
competition to develop (both with imports of raw material and new firms starting up with
imported machinery).
They export to neighboring countries33 (Venezuela and Ecuador). Owners and managers
of the two firms visited saw the Free Trade Agreement with the US (TLC) as a great
opportunity but they saw Mercosur as a threat. In general, the most feared competition is
that of large developing countries like India, China (for their demand of scrap copper),
and Brazil (for its supply of raw material-i.e. direct competition).
32 They keep connected on a real-time basis to the London Metal Exchange
(http://www.lme.co.uk/copper.asp) to adjust their prices.
3 One business owner had plans to open a plant in Venezuela to take advantage of current taxing
policies.
2.3. Manufacturing firms
This thesis focuses on them (see chapter III). Firms of all sizes and degrees of formality
compete in this market. In this section, I will only describe their marketing strategies. As
described below in 2.4, the businesses that buy from the manufacturing firms can be
small or medium/large. For most manufacturing firms, small clients represent the bulk of
their sales 4 . Their marketing strategy consists in going from town to town, from one
small business to the next not only to offer products to potential clients but also to visit
regular clients to collect payments and to get new delivery orders. Most of the
transactions are handled in cash. Sales representatives are often in charge of this task but
most firm owners believe that no one can do it better than himself or herself. The owner
of one of the smallest firms goes to the extreme of loading his car with parts and traveling
from town to town doing sales; he takes no orders, nor makes deliveries, he focuses in
direct sales.
2.4. Retail and mechanical shops
The businesses that buy from the manufacturing firms represent the most heterogeneous
part of the supply chain. They can be divided into large buyers (intermediate wholesalers
and large businesses) and petty buyers (retailers). Hence this link includes, on the one
hand, large transportation companies that repair their own buses (or trucks), and medium
and large hardware stores that distribute the products across the country, and on the other
hand, small retail and mechanic shops, and stores that service buses and trucks in the
sidewalk in front of their premises. The latter are located in areas known as playas
34 A few (the most formal ones) tend to focus on large buyers only.
(beaches) spread across the city and they can be found in all major cities in Colombia.
These areas are located either in wide unpaved roads or in streets with wide sidewalks.
There, the buses can park and be repaired in situ by mechanics that work in the street.
These mechanics borrow parts from the retail stores and pay back once they finish their
work and get paid. No contractual labor attachment exists between the mechanics and the
retail stores, but a mechanic will only borrow from one store. Given the informal nature
of the final consumer (bus owners and drivers) businesses that deal with it tend to have
lower levels of compliance with tax regulations.
In short, informality is higher at both ends of the chain and both raw material suppliers
and manufacturing firms are 'caught in the middle'.
3. Globalization and liberalization
Besides the changes in the sector brought by the formalization of transportation
(Transmilenio) in the city, manufacturing firms face increasing foreign competition and
at the same time, greater possibilities of expansion in the context of further trade
liberalization. The most notable case is the free trade agreement between Colombia and
Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela) signed at the end of
2005 by president Uribe.
Globalization and trade liberalization policies have had additional implications within the
supply chain. As noted above, scrap metal collectors can choose to sell in the local
market or export to get higher prices for their stuff. Given that the metallurgical firms are
large businesses, they have tried to lobby before the national government for trade
regulations to protect them from external demand for copper. So far they have been
unsuccessful but they are beginning to organize and with the help of the National
Association of Industrialists (ANDI) they might build the political clout to have the
government protect their interests. Similar efforts by business associations have
succeeded in Venezuela and Argentina. This could be good for manufacturing firms and
shops as the limited supply (under great demand from China) has tripled the price of raw
materials in the past two years, which has translated in higher prices of the final product.
Another example of the impact of globalization in this sector (described in 1.3.2) had an
American multinational lobbying for protection from Brazilian bus imports. The effort
resulted in a joint venture between a Brazilian multinational and a local company.
Conclusions
Rapid urbanization and weak governments (at the national and local levels) allowed
informal systems of urban transportation to develop in Colombian cities over the past
fifty years. Around them, several domestic supply chains flourished to provide the buses
of these systems with the maintenance their owners and drivers could afford. The supply
chain in this study is heterogeneous. It includes firms of all sizes and degrees of formality
who are facing an increasingly changing scenario. National liberalization policies,
enhanced enforcement capacity of tax authorities, and formalization of transportation
systems are some the biggest challenges the small firms studied have to face. It is in this
dynamic context where the studied manufacturing firms have thrived. I now turn to them.
Chapter Ilil. Small firms: nature and practices
1. Nature of the manufacturing firms
"The urban informal microenterprise should be viewed as a part of a voluntary small
firm sector similar to those in advanced countries that, due to the laxity of
enforcement of labor and other codes, is able to choose the optimal degree of
participation in formal institutions."
William F. Maloney (2004, p 1173)
This sector, as described in Chapter II, has thrived in parallel with the city's informal
transportation system35. There are manufacturing firms of all sizes (mostly small and
medium) competing in this market. But this sector is specific and possesses fundamental
differences with other sectors where small firms proliferate. There are two distinct
features of the production process that define the kind of small firms in the sector. First,
initial capital investment is relatively large when compared to that of other sectors. At the
present time, starting one of these firms requires a minimum of five thousand US dollars
to buy a simple manual lathe. This is why the small firms in this study are closer to the
dynamics of self-employment of industrialized countries as described by Maloney (2004)
35 The firms also supply the transportation systems of other major cities in the country. They all
have a similar history and institutional dynamic as the informal transportation system of Bogota
(described in 11.1)
than to more rudimentary sectors like the shoe manufacturers studied by Peattie36 (1981).
Second, this expensive machinery requires relatively skilled labor to operate it. Lathes are
complex machines that demand a high level of know-how from the operator. These two
characteristics will define the way these businesses are started and from a broader
perspective, the entry to the market. Consequently, all firms are started by either a
qualified worker3 7 that gets the required capital (from his savings or from a capitalist
partner) or by an entrepreneur with some experience in the sector that can get the
required capital and labor.
There are no differences as to the technology used. The machinery includes both
automatic and manual lathes. All firms have the same kind of machinery: big firms have
more machines and small firms have fewer38 . This kind of machinery allows for a wide
variety of different products: pieces for auto-parts, motorcycle and bicycle parts, gasoline
stoves parts, junctures for domestic natural gas systems, generic small parts for different
(non-standardized) uses. This flexibility means that firms not always compete with the
same array of products and they try to diversify to produce for other markets.
Nevertheless, parts for buses of the urban transportation system seem to be the most
profitable since they are the bulk of the production of the firms studied.
36 "New firms continually enter the industry at a very small scale and with negligible amounts of
capital." (Peattie, 1981. p 228)
* Skills come from working experience or from technical education (in the Government's
technical education programs-SENA--or high-schools with a technical focus).
38 Firms studied had between two and eighty machines (mostly manual and automatic lathes but
also cutters, drills and other metal-mechanical machinery). The average among the ten firms was
nineteen machines.
Producing these parts at a higher quality requires larger machinery with a different
technology: parts are manufactured by injecting melted metal into molds instead of being
lathed out of brass bars. No firm in Colombia (or its neighboring countries) possesses this
technology, which would require a significantly larger capital in investment. The size of
the market could provide the returns to scale required by investments of this size.
Nevertheless, the lack of demand for-more expensive-higher quality parts has allowed
for technology to remain unchanged in this sector for over twenty years. Perhaps the new
wave of formalization in urban public transportation will provide the necessary demand
(in volume and in quality) for such an upscale in production. But as seen in Chapter II,
the expansion of the formal transportation might take time.
Demographics of the firms studied
The firms in this study are between two and thirty years old. The average manufacturing
firm (among the ten) is nineteen years old. There are all family businesses. Unlike
Peattie's shoe-manufacturing sector, where some firm owners had "no interest at all in
expansion" (p 214), all firm owners in this sector aim at growth, albeit some being more
effective than others.
In The Other Path (1989), De Soto showed how endless streams of red tape pushed
businesses into informality. His study called for "simplifying and decentralizing the
governmental bureaucracy" (p 247). In Bogota this has been partly achieved. The process
for registering a business has become easier over the years and now it does not take more
than one day. Firms get their ID-RUE (Registro Unico Tributario)-from the Chamber
of Commerce of Bogota (CCB), a highly efficient semi-private organization.
Additionally, all businesses (even the smallest) and individuals in the labor market now
have a tax ID number. In the case of businesses that must pay the VAT the ID is the NIT
(Nnimero de Identificaci6n Tributaria), and for businesses that are not required to pay the
VAT and for common people the ID is the RUT (Registro Oinico Tributario). Paperwork
to obtain these IDs is simple; for example, the application for RUT can be filled and
submitted online. Additionally, submitting a tax return and paying can be done at most
banks and does not take longer than any other bank transaction.
Considering the simplification of procedures for formal registration, the perceived high
degree of enforcement capacities of tax authorities, and the specific nature of the firms
studied (high initial capital investment and use of skilled labor), it is not surprising to see
that, in the context of this study, all the firms are registered 39 and comply with tax
regulations-albeit in varying degrees. There was not one that was completely informal
or 'out of the radar' of authorities. This shows how thin the division between the formal
and informal sectors can be, or better yet, how it is a continuum rather than a clear line.
This is coherent with Tokman's (1992) finding that "most [businesses] are found in the
middle of the continuum" (p 5). Thus, firms with different levels of compliance operate,
compete, and transact in this market. This raises a number of managerial challenges. For
instance, as described in 11.2, it is in both ends of the supply chain (chatarreros, and retail
and mechanical shops) where the highest levels of informality can be found.
Manufacturing firms can sometimes find themselves in an awkward intermediary position
where raw material suppliers are formal and many of their buyers are informal. This
asymmetry can be challenging from a managerial perspective. The following is modified
39 The fact that all firms in this study are registered could signal a bias in the sample (see
Methodology section in the introduction chapter). Nevertheless, it is surprising that in this study
even the smallest firms with the lowest levels of compliance with VAT are registered.
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version of the stylized diagram presented in chapter I of a supply chain of three firms
producing twenty units with a ten percent VAT. It shows how a firm (Firm 2) can buy all
its inputs formally and at the same time sell half of its production without an invoice.
While its real value added is 300, it ends up declaring only 50 (that is, 250 of product
sold minus 200 of inputs).
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Example of unevenly formalized supply chain of 20 units - mixed
levels of compliance with the VAT
(three firms, production of twenty units with a ten percent VAT)
The owner (or the firm's accountant) must be skilled to handle the imbalance of paying
the VAT on all its raw material purchases and selling a share of its production without an
invoice (gray area in the diagram). If not handled properly, the VAT paid can become a
cost of production, reducing profitability margins for that year. One of the firms visited
was on the verge of bankruptcy because of poor accounting/planning; the firm bought all
of its raw material with VAT but sold most of its production without an invoice. Thus it
was not able to collect the rebates on inputs, carrying the full burden of the VAT paid to
the supplier. Thus, partial non-compliance can directly become more expensive than
compliance.
It is important to note that, although the VAT legislation is very complex as a whole (as
seen in 1.3.3.), firm owners are informed of what their tax obligations are. The
complexity noted on the first chapter refers to the entire system and its "excessive rate
differentiation" (Bird et al., 2005). This is a view of the system from above, important for
tax administration and reform. In contrast, from below-i.e. from the perspective of a
firm that specializes in a specific product-the rates and procedural requirements of the
VAT for the inputs and outputs are easily learned. Again, the chained structure of the
VAT helps spread information on obligations and requirements.
Finally, it is noteworthy that from a long-term perspective, compliance has been slowly
growing in this sector. This suggests that enhanced enforcing capabilities of the DIAN
have allowed the chained structure of the VAT to have an incremental formalizing effect
within a supply chain.
2. Practices of small firms
As seen above, in this sector there are no firms that are completely informal. On the one
hand they all are registered in the CCB registry and have a tax ID number. On the other
hand, most of them maintain a portion of their business 'under the table' with
accompanying double accounting practices. Such practices tend to consume a lot of
efforts from managers and accountants. Thus, and contrary to some of the literature on
the informal sector and the VAT reviewed in 1.3.1.2., it is neither inexperienced
management nor inability to cope with the managerial expenses what keep firms from
complying. Non-compliance is itself more complex and expensive. Yet non-compliance is
widespread. This apparent contradiction has several explanations.
In the following section, I disaggregate the rationales for business practices (as expressed
by firm owners and managers) in three different groups: non-compliance, transition and
compliance. Although separated for the purpose of analysis, it is a bundle of them that
shape a firm owner's decisions. They can be seen as the variables of a complex equation
that determines the level of compliance of a firm with the VAT.
2.1. Reasons for not complying with the VAT
2.1.1. Rational choice
There are two justifications for informal transactions (without an invoice) that stem from
a conscious (rational) choice. They could easily be seen in the light of the economic
literature on tax compliance (as mentioned in 1.1.).
o To avoid loosing comparative advantage
Not paying taxes gives a competitive edge over other firms. This is a textbook case of
free-riding. One owner declared that a friend, owner of a competing firm, complained to
him for having too large of a share of his sales under the table and thus becoming an
unlawful competitor. He answered that non-compliance was his comparative advantage
and that he knew he risked losing his business if the DIAN caught him. Thus, there is
room in the market for firms that base their competitiveness on practices that are risky in
the context of a country with some enforcement of State regulations (in this case, tax and
labor regulations). Nevertheless, this owner had been in this business for over twenty
years. This goes in line with some common beliefs on the informal sector and Peattie's
(1980) finding of the perception by more formal business of "the threat [of] smaller
'pirate workshop' which can produce more cheaply by remaining inconspicuous and
avoiding" (p 228) legal obligations.
o To avoid loosing customers
Contrary to the more proactive argument described above, there is also a reactive
reasoning. Paying taxes can represent a change in the way business has been carried out
for years. Some firms, despite serious efforts to legalize all transactions, maintain a
portion of them off-the-record to keep from loosing stubborn clients. At first sight, this
fear appears to be well founded. One of the firms lost over 120 customers40 (out of 700),
as a result of formalizing all its transactions (see 111.2.2.3.). Nevertheless, they were all
small clients and the owner perceives the loss as not harmful in the long term: the volume
of sales foregone was relatively small and the firm saved the managerial and accounting
costs entailed by doing business with tens of small clients.
2.1.2. Demand from clients and indifference toward regulations
Small firms often do not declare a fraction of their sales because clients ask for deals off-
the-record. One firm owner stated that he wanted to move towards higher compliance but
he believed it was improper for him to suggest to his clients that things should be done
differently-i.e. use an invoice. To some extent this reason is similar to the previous one
(to avoid loosing customers) but in this case the perception on the part of the firm owner
40 Clients that sell without tax in order to provide lower prices to the final consumer.
that it would be improper to even suggest a different arrangement signals to a degree of
indifference toward regulations. It could be assimilated to the old "what the client asks,
the client gets" rationale. He does not fear loosing his client because his does not even
consider suggesting a different arrangement and he does not see it as his competitive edge
because he can use an invoice if he is asked to. In short, what leads to non-compliance is
more a willingness to accommodate his client more than a rational motivation to cut
corners.
2.1.3. Being used to doing business in a certain way
Owners get accustomed to a certain way of doing business and see change as
troublesome. This path-dependence can allow them to resist growing external pressure
(both from the tax administration and from suppliers and/or buyers) to formalize.
2.2. Reasons for starting to comply with the VAT
2.2.1. Fear of sanctions
A seen in 1.2, over the past forty years, the Colombian Tax Administration (DIAN), has
grown both in size and in resources. Its enforcing capabilities, although far from those of
an equivalent agency in a developed country, have improved considerably41 . The DIAN
has today a strong presence in the mind of business owners. As this agency grows and
becomes a stronger enforcer, firms are more prone to complying. All firm owners
41 Despite the information gathered about this agency, the reasons behind its relative success
(when compared to similar ones in the developing world) are beyond me. This could be the
subject of further research.
perceive a high degree of non-compliance in their sector but they agree that the DIAN is
not to be taken lightly. This perception can be explained by first-hand experience of firm-
owners in the sector. Three firms (out of ten) had had problems with tax authorities: two
of the firms had to bribe visiting auditors, and the other firm reached a legal agreement to
pay off the debt.
In short, beyond issues if corruption or actual effectiveness of audits, the DIAN is
perceived as capable and present enforcer among these small businesses. The enforcing
capacity of the tax administration (despite being underfunded, and to a certain degree
corrupt) is, as expected one of the main factors in determining the level of compliance of
a firm.
2.2.2. New management: a new generation
All firms studied are family businesses and are around twenty years old. Accordingly, in
several firms a new generation is taking or has taken over their management. This second
generation of family managers is better educated (all college graduates) and has fresh
ideas for the business. It is here where a struggle to formalize unfolds most clearly. These
young professionals find that their ideas for new ways of doing business have to confront
the old ways and often its consequences too. For example, a young engineer that took
over his father's firm had to negotiate with the DIAN after an audit and has been paying
for four years the debt of overdue taxes that his father left. He pays in order to keep the
DIAN from seizing his business.
2.2.3. Formalization of work inside the firm
Managerial upgrading can translate into higher levels of compliance. Reorganizing a
firm's production and administrative structures can make tax evasion a liability. In such
process, it becomes evident how non-compliance with tax regulations can jeopardizes the
firm's future.
This was the case in a firm that underwent the process of quality certification (ISO 9000).
The owner hired a managing consultant from the CCB that would visit the firm every
month for over two years. The consultant would make recommendations on how to
reorganize both the production and the management/accounting structures of the firm4 2 .
One of the steps of the upgrading process included the creation of a long-term business
plan (strategic planning) for expansion of the firm. In that scenario, balanced books and
good credit standing were needed to access a bank loan. It is not enough to be registered
before the CCB and to have registered property rights over the plant's building and
machinery. When businesses seek formal credit, they need to show they are profitable,
well organized and have potential to grow. All of this appears in the firm's books. Double
accounting usually makes the inventories 'on the books' behave in an erratic manner and
profits to appear as low or non-existent. The owner himself believed it was the firm's
internal reorganization that pushed the firm into higher levels of compliance.
In contrast, another firm, where the second generation was taking over, managed to
become more productive (reorganize its production, augmented its sales, improved debt
recovery) but kept a short-term vision of business and maintained a sizable share of its
transactions under the table. Despite the fact that gross income augmented, all eventual
profits were being consumed by the high interests rates of loans taken from private
lenders. Applications for formal credit were rejected due to accounting records that
42 The consultant's services are not cheap and its recommendations are taken seriously.
showed a company with poor performance. The owner decided to come forward and
explain the situation (high non-declared revenues being consumed by the interests of
informal loans) to the bank manager with no luck. Formal supply of capital was there for
a firm of that size, but the legacy of informal practices prevented the firm from gaining
access to it. Thus, non-compliance reduces a firm's chances to grow and threatens its
survival.
Additionally, as will be seen in the following sub-section, the level of compliance within
a single transaction is subject of bargaining between the firm and its client, which makes
standardization of administrative procedures-one of the bases of managerial
upgrading-impracticable. Each transaction is somehow unique and demands full
attention from owners and accountants. This is consistent with some of the impressions I
got on the firms while carrying out my interviews. In quality certified, more formal firms,
managers and owners seem more relaxed and were able to have 45 minute uninterrupted
conversations. Contrastingly, owners of smaller more informal businesses seemed
overwhelmed by work and were constantly interrupted; everything has to be run through
the owner. Upgrading provides order to both production and managerial structures within
the company and assigns clear tasks to each employee. The hierarchy is explicit and the
owner does not have to deal with all the petty issues of the day-to-day operation of the
firm.
2.2.4. Demand from clients or suppliers
In several cases, it was clients that pushed for a more formal way of doing business -i.e.
started asking for invoice. But once again, the division between formality and
informality, even within a single transaction, is a continuum. Firms not only have clients
with whom they do all their transactions with an invoice and others with whom no
invoice is used. Firms often bargain over the percentage of the purchase order that will be
made off the records. Again, this provides an image of how complex, from a managerial
point of view, partial non-compliance can be4 3 ; a single purchase (that is shipped within a
single box) has to be divided into two separate transactions from an accounting point of
view. Keeping track of this double accounting within a single transaction is a demanding
task.
2.3. Reasons for complying with the VAT
There were businesses that had always been formal in their transactions and others that
achieved 'complete' formality over time. Their answers included fear of sanctions
(explained above) and:
2.3.1. Being used to doing business in a certain way
The same reasoning for non-compliance (in 2.1.3.) also applies for compliance. Two firm
owners stated they had always done business in a lawful manner. They both had moved
from formal companies (the first from a large business in this sector, the other from a
large oil multinational) to open their own small business, a common practice in both
industrialized and developing countries (Maloney, 2004). Both saw non-compliance as an
unnecessary complication. Their compliance appeared to stem more from a pragmatic
consideration or a simple custom, than from being in a 'moral higher ground'.
4I am assuming that under absolute non-compliance bargaining is unnecessary and accounting is
simpler, in other words, transaction costs are lower.
2.3.2. Ethics
Only one owner declared to have a moral/civic (somewhat abstract) obligation to comply.
He is a minority and unlike the previous category his compliance resulted from a more
conscious process. Not even in this case was there a connection made between payment
of taxes and investment by the State in public goods. He saw compliance with taxes as
abiding a law not as contributing to social welfare. In short, not even in this case was the
connection between collection and expenditure of taxes by the State made.
In short, in the sector studied, both external actors (tax agency, clients and suppliers) and
internal processes (ethics, culture, upgrading) have an effect on a firm's level of
compliance.
3. Nature of the sector
3.1. No business association
As for other aspects of their business practices that define the nature of the sector, one
that is notorious is the lack of organization within the sector. Firms are not organized and
receive no help from the government or any other organization. There used to be an
association-Asometal-but it disappeared for lack of affiliates. There is deep mistrust
among competing firms. All firms that provide parts for the urban transportation market
manufacture the same products (no differentiation), and firm owners zealously guard
information on their businesses; for example, lists of prices are to be kept secret from
their competitors by their clients (retail stores and mechanical shops). This points to poor
production management. A firm owner had recently, and for the first time in years, made
a thorough production costs study-not an easy task considering that the firm produces
over a thousand different types of parts44. When he compared his prices with those of
other firms (including larger firms) he noticed wide differences in both directions, some
pieces were overvalued others were undervalued. This would suggest that given that they
all use similar machinery, prices are established over time in trial-and-error basis.
3.2. Exports
This market is not restricted to domestic demand. There is demand for low/intermediate
quality parts in other countries of South and Central America. Most of the firms visited
currently export to neighboring countries (Costa Rica, Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador). The
nature of the products allows for an individual order from a client to fit in a small box.
This way it can be shipped easily through regular mail without fulfilling any of the legal
requirements to export or pay any taxes. This informal export is a common practice
among most firms but it represents only a small share of their sales.
Two of the firms visited were starting to move in a different, more formal direction. The
first was starting to make small shipments to Venezuela with all the legal requirements. It
was the son of the owner (a college graduate) who took the initiative. He complained
about the cumbersome amount of red tape entailed and the low profitability of those
transactions. He was doing it formally only to gain experience and to build an exporting
portfolio for future ventures in the framework of the TLC (Free Trade Agreement with
44 A lathe can produced hundreds of these small parts per hour. Although firms handle over a
thousand of references, a machine can work all day producing a particular reference to provide
the firm with enough inventory to cover the sales of several months. Thus a small firm with only
two machines can respond to this demand for thousands of different parts.
the U.S.). It was a long-term view that pushed him to do so, for he sees the future of the
company in the global economy, exporting to larger markets like the U.S.
The second firm had just joined a program from a semi-private organization (CAFAM)
called Pequeros Exportadores (or Small-exporters). Again, the firm joined the program
as part of its long-range plan, which aimed at achieving a higher percent of the
production exported.
It is noteworthy that the businesses that were moving in this direction were larger and
more formal. This type of firms sees the TLC and trade liberalization policies in general
as new possibilities for expansion of their business. Nevertheless, these long-term plans
seemed to be based on vague perceptions of foreign markets more than based on concrete
studies, visits, or actual connections with eventual clients. More than anything, they
represent a willingness to jump to a larger market in a globalized economy.
Conclusions
In the context of Colombia, a certain degree of enforcement and reduction of red tape,
have led business across sectors to register. The manufacturing firms in this study are
registered and pay at least some of their VAT. Within this environment of partial
formality, high costs of compliance are not keeping firms from complying. On the
contrary, partial non-compliance is more complex and expensive than compliance itself
both in the short term (increasing managerial and accounting costs-and in cases of poor
management-greatly increasing production costs) and in the long term (hindering access
to formal credit). In a dynamic context of constant change, both external and internal
factors will determine a firm's decision to comply. External actors relevant to a firm's
compliance with the VAT belong to both the State (tax administration), and the market
(clients and suppliers). Internal processes that influence a firm's decision to comply
include moral principles (ethics) and customs of firm owners, management changes, and
production upgrading.
Chapter IV. Lessons and Guidelines for Policy
1. Lessons
The following three lessons are drawn from small firms that manufacture small parts for
buses in Colombia, but they can be applied to other contexts or at least can help to qualify
the discussion on broad topics such as taxation in developing countries, the informal
sector, and small firms.
Partial non-compliance is more expensive than compliance
Although the VAT legislation is complex as a whole, small firm owners are most of the
time fully aware of their duties, responsibilities, and liabilities. The fixed costs entailed
by compliance are high for small firms (see 1.3.1.2.) but they do not seem to impair
compliance in the sector studied. Managerial and accounting costs of compliance appear
to be well within reach especially when one considers that all firms with a degree of non-
compliance (a majority in this sector) have double-accounting practices. In that scenario,
maintaining a firm's books balanced in order to avoid increasing production costs or just
problems with tax authorities is a demanding task. It requires skillful management and
planning and careful accounting. In that sense, because of these extra managerial
expenses (and in some cases production costs) partial non-compliance with tax
regulations is more complex and expensive than compliance itself. Keeping two or three
sets of accounting books requires additional efforts from managers and accountants,
which makes non-compliance costs higher than compliance costs in the short run. But
these practices also imply higher costs in the long run (explained below).
Formalization is not a consequence of growth
As described above, the small firms studied have varying degrees of compliance with tax
regulations, that is, they have formalized to different degrees. The level of compliance
wit the VAT varies from one firm to the next. Nevertheless, contrary to a conclusion
often reached in the literature on the subject, I did not find that "firms do become more
formal with age and size" (Maloney, 2004, p 1168). Most of the firms in this study were
in average nineteen years old. Among them, there are firms of all sizes with high or full
compliance with the VAT (black triangles in the graph below). Among the older ones4 5 in
this group, some have succeeded (i.e. they grew) and others have not46 . Firms with
medium or low levels of compliance (empty and shaded circles in the graph below) with
the VAT were all small except one that was medium (30 employees). The only medium
firm in this category, had overwhelmed management, no room or capital to think about
expansion and was struggling to avoid bankruptcy-heavily burden by the interests of
informal loans47. This means that firms can only grow when they are formal, independent
of their age. That is, formality is independent of the firm's age and is a prerequisite and
not a consequence of growth.
45 There was also a recently created firm that despite being small (only two employees),
maintained full compliance with the VAT (see 111.2.3.1.). .
46 This is consistent with the dynamics of small firms studied by Mead and Liedholm (1998).
47 This firm would represent the "roof' of the informal strategy.
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Nevertheless, given that when a second generation takes over, a firm tends to move
towards higher compliance (described in 111.2.2.2.), necessarily there should be (in the
long term) a correlation between a firm's age (not size) and how formal it is. This
tendency appears to be true for some of the firms in this study that are just starting to
make that change. Nevertheless, it is a change disjointed from the trajectory of the firm
up until that point. It only comes after decades of operation and only in families where
the second generation on the one hand, is educated, and in the other hand, cares about the
family business. Thus, it is not a spontaneous consequence of age or size of the firm but
of the nature of some family businesses.
Non-compliance hinders growth
One possible explanation for the described relationship between growth and compliance
would be the limited access to the formal capital market of firms with higher evasion of
VAT. In this sense, the findings of this research would appear to be in line with those of
De Soto (1989, 2000). Nevertheless, De Soto's recipes to trigger development through
formalization 8 are to some extent already in place in Colombia (as seen in III.1.).
Owners of firms have legal tenure of the buildings where they produce and of the
machinery with which they produce. Businesses (even small ones) are registered before
the CCB and the DIAN. Their problem does not lie in the lack of collateral or of
acknowledgement of existence by the formal system. When grating credit to a firm, a
bank not only seeks collateral (which firms have), but also good business performance.
VAT evasion makes inventories of firms behave erratically "on the books" and profits
seem limited or non-existent. This translates into a not always accurate picture of poor
business performance (low cash flows, small or no profits), which in turn limits their
access to formal credit.
One would think that this could work as an incentive for business owners to move
towards higher compliance. However, the lack of a long-term view of business that
placed the firms in that situation in the first place, also makes them seek a short-term
solution; firm owners (often pressured by the need for investment or working capital)
recur to private lenders. These lenders charge monthly rates of 5% or more (over 70%
yearly rate, compared to 19% yearly rate in the formal capital market). Thus, firms often
48 Recipes include reducing red tape and removing legislation that impedes business from
registering and fulfilling their legal obligations (de Soto, 1989), and granting legal titles of
property so that assets can be used as collateral (i.e. become capital) and thus provide access to
formal credit to millions of people (De Soto, 2000).
drag with high financial costs that in turn limit their chances of growing. In short, VAT
evasion tends to undermine afirm's ability to grow.
In this sense, enhancing tax compliance in these 'hard-to-tax' sectors should become a
priority for governments, not only in order to increase their tax revenue, but also to
promote economic growth. It is to how to do this that I now turn.
2. Guidelines for policy design
The following are not precise recommendations for specific programs within a given
agency or ministry. They are broad lines of action from which organizations at different
levels of government (or donor agencies) can draw when devising programs for the
Colombian case. I put forth guidelines that can help improve voluntary compliance and
marginally improve enforcement through policy.
2.1. Improving voluntary compliance
Engage compliers
Given that providers and buyers influence a firm's decision to comply with the VAT,
raise awareness on how other firms' non-compliance is hurting everybody. This goes
beyond using peer-pressure since (as seen in chapter III) external actors can effectively
drive firms into compliance. A somewhat similar effort was implemented by the DIAN in
a public campaign against smuggling. The campaign revolved around data on the impact
of contraband on the level of unemployment in the country (people going out of business
because of unlawful competition from smuggled goods). The connection brought forth
the invisible negative social and economic consequences of purchasing smuggled goods.
Support upgrading
Promote upgrading and ease the transition of family businesses into professional
management and upgrading in general. Promoting-and even subsidizing-firms to
obtain quality certifications (ISO 9000, 9001, etc.) would not only translate into lower
VAT evasion but also help improve the competitiveness of the sector within the context
of ever-widening trade and capital liberalization. The State can draw from the experience
of existing programs of the business-administration consulting sector-e.g. CCB, quality
certification consulting firms. Such programs include not only upgrade consulting but
also outreach, orientation, and diagnosis activities.
Favor earmarked taxes
The explicit connection between tax and expenditure strengthens the social contract. Such
taxes are easier to implement at the local level. Experience on the Cobro por valorizacidn
used in Bogota to finance infrastructure locally can be a steppingstone to implementing
similar charges for other investments (e.g. security, road maintenance).
Develop a tax culture
This would be a broader recommendation, that is, beyond the context of small firms.
Awareness raising campaigns can help move citizens beyond a perception of 'taxes for
taxes sake' into taxes as contributions to the common good or even as social solidarity.
Past efforts should be revisited. Two salient examples were the programs to develop a tax
culture of the Mockus administration in Bogota between 2001 and 2003. One of the
programs was the Chiva Tributaria. It consisted in taking (with wide media coverage) top
executives of large businesses-i.e. the largest taxpayers-to impoverished zones of the
city where the local government had built large public schools with the highest
architectural and construction standards to provide the poorest children of the city with
free education with the highest academic standards. It aimed not only at connecting
collection with expenditure but also at emphasizing the highly redistributive structure of
the tax structure in the city. The other program was called 110% por Bogota, which
allowed taxpayers to make a voluntary contribution of an additional 10% over the regular
local tax return (land and corporate) while providing the option to direct the additional
contribution to a specific program or project. Over the past four years, over 140.000
taxpayers of all sectors (poor, rich, households and businesses) have contributed.
Nevertheless, a caveat of these programs is that they took place after a decade of
increasing efficiency of the local government. The vicious circle that weakens the social
contract (described in 1.1.2.) was starting to reverse.
A note on Tax Culture
The ultimate goal should be State reform towards more participation and engagement
from citizens around tax and expenditure issues. I believe tax culture is a foundational
matter to a nation. It is not a question of citizens being "happy" about paying taxes. A
civil society publicly engaged around tax issues, can enhance accountability and
governance. This will lead to a more efficient and legitimate State49. The DIAN
(Colombian Tax Administration) should take an active role in education to develop a tax
culture in the country. Given its potential contribution to governance, the DIAN should
49 Additionally, and beyond this philosophical consideration, as seen in the previous section, non-
compliance hurts a firm's chances to grow. Promoting tax culture to enhance compliance could
be in itself a strategy to promote economic growth.
work in coordination with (and draw resources from) other State institutions as the
planning department, the Office of the Vice-President and local governments.
2.2. Improving enforcement
Audit of supply chains, not just firms
A way to improve enforcement with the limited resources available could be to adopt a
supply chain perspective to visits and audits by tax inspectors. Given the chained
structure of the VAT, approaching entire supply chains instead of individual firms could
make auditing more thorough and effective. Recent technological improvements within
the DIAN to consolidate information-such as the integrated fiscal information system,
MUISCA (DIAN, 2004)-could make this a feasible task, although a technical
evaluation of this proposal is needed. Nevertheless, the mere announcement of such a
measure could entice buyers and sellers to impose compliance on other firms.
Taking into account the budgetary and institutional limitations of the DIAN, the
Colombian State has more room to improve compliance of small firms with the VAT via
promotion of voluntary compliance-where many actors within the government and in
the civil society can get involved-than through mere enforcement. Moving in that
direction can have significant positive externalities such as improving governance and in
a broader sense in constructing a stronger social contract (CFS, 2005).
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